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Abstract
We study the problem of secure information flow for Boxed Ambients in terms of non-
interference. We develop a sound type system that provides static guarantees of absence
of unwanted flow of information for well typed processes. Non-interference is stated, and
proved, in terms of a typed notion of contextual equivalence for Boxed Ambients akin to
the corresponding equivalence defined for Mobile Ambients.
1 Introduction
The calculus of Boxed Ambients [4] is a novel process calculus derived from Mo-
bile Ambients [8] to provide finer grained abstractions for resource protection and
access control in systems of distributed and mobile agents.
In Mobile Ambients, abbreviated MA, agents are processes of the form n[P ],
representing the ambient, named n, executing the process P . Processes can be
composed in parallel, as in P j Q, exercise a capability, as in M:P , declare local
names as in (n)P , or simply do nothing as in 0. Ambients may be nested to form
a tree structure that can be dynamically reconfigured by exercising the capabilities
in; out and open. As an example, the system
k [in n:P
1
j m[out n:P
2
]] j n[open k:Q]
contains two ambients, k and n, running in parallel. The system may evolve as
follows. First, ambient k may migrate to n by exercising the capability “in n”:
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n[open k:Q j k [P
1
j m[out n:P
2
]]]. Now n may “dissolve” k unleashing its con-
tents: n[Q j P
1
j m[out n:P
2
]]. Finally, m may exit n: n[Q j P
1
] j m[P
2
]. In addi-
tion, ambients and processes may communicate. In MA, communication is anony-
mous, and happens inside ambients. The system (x)P j hMi represents the parallel
composition of two processes, the output process hMi “dropping” the message M ,
and the input process (x)P reading the message M and continuing as Pfx := Mg.
The calculus of Boxed Ambients, henceforth BA, is a variant of MA from which
it inherits the primitives in and out (but not open) for mobility with exactly the
same semantics. As for communication, besides local exchanges, BA relies on an
additional set of primitives that provide for the exchange of values across ambient
boundaries, between parent and child. Syntactically, this is achieved by means of
tags that specify the location with which the exchange should take place: as an
example, (x)nP indicates an input from a child ambient name n, while hMi" is an
output to the parent ambient (in the latter case we speak of an upward exchange).
The semantics of parent-child exchanges is defined by the following reductions 3 :
(x)
n
P j n[hMi
"
Q]  Pfx := Mg j n[Q]
hMi
n
P j n[(x)
"
Q]  P j n[Qfx := Mg]
This semantics of communication yields, as a byproduct, a direct interpretation of
the local and upward anonymous channels of an ambient as that ambient’s “re-
source space”: the local channel is private to the ambient, whereas the upward
channel is available for access by clients. By relying on this interpretation, one can
formalize a precise notion of resource access, namely: (x)nP is a read access to n,
whereas hMinP is a write access.
In [5] we showed that BA provides an effective framework for resource access
security: specifically, we used a typed version of BA to model multilevel Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) policies, including both military (no read-up, no write-
down) and commercial (no read-up, no write-up) security 4 .
Boxed Ambients and Information Flow Security
The type system we defined in [5] was targeted at resource access control, and
specifically designed to protect resources, viz. channels, from undesired uses by
unauthorized clients. Here, we change perspective, and focus on a different analysis
that targets information flow. To motivate the change in perspective, consider the
following example, where ` is a “low-level” ambient and h a “high-level” one:
`[(x)
h
P j h[hMi
"
Q j R]] (1)
3 These are not the reductions we introduced in [5,4]. The choice of the present new semantics is
motivated in Section 2.
4 Although the resource access control policies we study in [5] are based on a different reduction
semantics, those techniques adapt smoothly to the new semantics (cf. Section 2 for a discussion).
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In the system of [5] the attempt by the process enclosed in the low-level ambient
` to read from h is classified as a read-up, and therefore rejected as “insecure” by
both military and commercial security, regardless of the information content of M .
On the other hand, if the expression M is public, i.e., low-level, there is no reason
for disallowing the read access: a piece of data is flowing from high to low, but the
flow is “secure” as the piece of data carries a “low” information content.
The goal of the present paper is to provide static safeguards against “unsafe”
flow of information. A first, rather intuitive, notion of information flow may di-
rectly be related to the flow of data: a system is “secure” if no high-level data flows
from high-level to low-level principals. This form of secure information flow is
easily accounted for, and enforced, by a static control over the transport layer used
for data communication, viz channels. If we classify data and channels according
to their security levels, absence of this form of “explicit” flow of information can
be guaranteed by requiring that:
(?) High-level data be only communicated along high-level channels, and high-
level channels be only located within high-level subjects.
A subtler, and more interesting, notion of information flow security is related to
the presence of implicit flow of information, resulting from indirect ways of trans-
mitting information (namely, covert channels) via system-wide side effects. To
illustrate, consider the following specialization of the system (1) above, where P is
“low level”:
`[(x)
h
hNi
"
j h[hMi
"
]] j (x)
`
P (2)
Assuming that M and N are low-level values, there is no direct flow in this system.
However, a covert channel is established between P and the ambient h, as P is
unleashed by an exchange that depends on the presence of the high ambient h, and
the very presence (or absence) of a high-level ambient can be assimilated to a bit
of high-level information that, in the system in question, flows downwards.
Information Flow Security and Non-interference
Defining what is exactly meant by (implicit) information flow can be hard (perhaps
impossible), and various authors have instead relied on non-interference, a concept
of easier formalization which implies absence of flow.
The notion of non-interference was first proposed by Goguen and Meseguer
[14] for deterministic state machines. The idea is to determine whether in a given
system the “inputs” of high level subjects (or “users”) may influence, i.e. interfere
with, the “outputs” of low level subjects. If the latter are invariant on the former,
then the system is decreed interference free.
Non-interference was later [13] reformulated in a CCS-like process calculus
as the so-called Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC) property, which implies
that low-level observers are insensitive to the presence of high-level components
(sources) in the system. Here we take the same approach, and rephrase the NDC
property to capture ambient-based specific aspects of computation, namely, locality
and mobility.
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Overview
Our technique for providing guarantees of non-interference in BA is based on static
typing. We rely on types both to formalize the notions of high and low data and pro-
cesses, and to define the relation of process equivalence underlying the definition
of non-interference.
The type system is based on ambient and capability types akin to those em-
ployed in companion type systems for MA. In addition, the types of our type system
carry security annotations that define the security clearance of values and processes.
Processes have the clearance of their enclosing ambient, while values (i.e. capabil-
ities and names) are assigned security levels as follows: names have the security
level associated to their type, while capabilities are decreed “low-level” data, based
on the observation that capabilities do not disclose their target ambient names, and
hence provide rather limited control over such names.
Having partitioned data and processes into “high” and “low”, we then single
out the set H of high level sources as the set of all processes that can only produce
high-level “inputs”, where an “input” corresponds to the presence, at top level,
either of a communication, or an ambient, or a mobility action. Again, this notion
is formalized with the help of the type system (see Section 3).
As the next step of our formalization, we introduce a relation of behavioral
equivalence to compare processes. This relation is a typed version of the equiva-
lence relation introduced in [9] for MA: a contextual equivalence that equates two
processes if and only if they admit the same elementary observations whenever
they are inserted inside any arbitrary, but well-typed, enclosing context. Our ob-
servability predicate is akin to the one studied in [9], but refined to capture the
core form of interaction between Boxed Ambients, namely, the ability for an am-
bient to exchange values along its upward channel. We thus say that a process P
exhibits a name n if P (reduces, in any number of steps, to a process that) con-
tains an ambient n that may accept interactions with the external environment,
that is if P (or any of the processes it reduces to) is structurally equivalent to
(m
1
) : : : (m
k
)(n[hMi
"
P
0
j Q
0
] j Q
00
) where n =2 fm
1
; : : : ; m
k
g. Even though
this notion of observation is specifically focused on communication, ambient mo-
bility is still observed, indirectly, via its consequences on upward communications,
as the following example illustrates (the presence of a high level ambient h triggers
the upward communication of the low-level ambient `):
(x)
`
P j `[in h:out h:hMi
"
] j h[ ]
Finally, we introduce the notion of contextual equivalence induced by a low level
observation: two (well-typed) processes P and Q are equivalent, P 
=
L
Q, if when-
ever they are inserted inside an arbitrary (well-typed) context, they exhibit the same
low level names. Based on that, we can phrase the NDC property of [13] for BA as:
(??) A process P is interference free if and only if 8H 2 H P jH 
=
L
P .
As in [13] non interference of P is checked only against high-level sources that
appear in parallel with P . This is rather natural in that context, since the topology
of CCS processes is completely flat. On the contrary, in BA ambients may be nested
79
Crafa, Bugliesi and Castagna
arbitrarily and, consequently, a high-level process interacting with P may also (i)
enclose P or (ii) be enclosed within P . It would then appear that our definition of
non-interference should be generalized to capture these additional cases. Indeed,
however, the definition, as given, does address these cases as ambients running in
parallel may nest arbitrarily as a result of mobility.
Main results and paper plan
The main contributions of the paper are (i) the definition of a sound type system for
the new version of BA and, more importantly, (ii) a proof that well-typed processes
are indeed interference free, in the sense we just outlined. The non-interference
proof builds on the technical tools developed in [9] by Cardelli and Gordon for MA,
adapting them to BA, and relies critically on the choice of contextual equivalence as
the underlying equivalence relation. In fact, as we discuss in Section 6, our present
results do not extend to finer equivalence relationships, such as barbed congruence
[19].
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2 we present a new version of
Boxed AmbientsCalculus, that differs from [4] in the semantics of its communica-
tion model. The resulting calculus has a simpler presentation and its finer-grained
control over ambient interactions more naturally enables the development of an al-
gebraic theory and a security assessment. In Section 3 we describe a sound type
system for BA, whose well typed processes are proved in Section 4 to be interfer-
ence free. Sections 5 and 6 are dedicated to related work and conclusions.
2 Boxed Ambients
In this section we review the syntax of Boxed Ambients from [4], and we present a
new reduction semantics, borrowed from [11] (where it was first introduced for the
Seal Calculus), and defined in terms of new rules for communication across am-
bient boundaries. The new calculus still adheres the principle of resource locality
distinctive of the original calculus, while at the same time providing ambients with
full control of exchanges they may have with their children.
2.1 Syntax
The syntax of the typed calculus is defined by the following productions:
Expressions
M ::= m  q names
 x  z variables
 in M enter M
 out M exit M
 M:M path
Locations
 ::= M names, variables
 " parent ambient
 ? local
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Processes
P ::= 0 stop
 M:P action
 (n:W )P restriction
 P j P composition
 M [P ] ambient
 !P replication
 (x
1
:W
1
; ::; x
k
:W
k
)

P input
 hM
1
; : : : ;M
k
i

P output
Expression Types
W ::= amb[E] ambient
 cap capability
Process Types
T ::= [E; F ] composite exchange
Exchanges
E; F ::= shh no exchange
 W
1
    W
n
exchange
As in MA, processes can be named, as in n[P ], be composed in parallel and repli-
cated, exercise a capability in or out, declare local names, do nothing or exchange
values. Input processes may read a value locally, as in (x:W )?P , from a subambient
named n, as in (x:W )nP , or from the enclosing context: (x:W )"P . Correspond-
ing primitives are provided for output. As usual, the syntax allows the formation
of meaningless process forms such as in (out m) or (out n)[P ]: these terms may
arise as a result of reduction, but only for ill-typed terms. We use a number of
notation conventions. We use m;n; : : : q to range over names, x; y; z over vari-
ables, and a; b; c over both. We write (~x: ~W )P for (x
1
:W
1
; : : : ; x
k
:W
k
)P , h
~
Mi for
hM
1
; : : : ;M
k
i, and ( ~p)P for (p
1
) : : : (p
k
)P . As usual we omit trailing dead
processes, writing M for M:0, h ~Mi for h ~Mi0, and a[ ] for a[0]. We also omit type
annotations in restrictions and input prefixes when they are not important. Finally,
the superscript ? denoting local communication, is omitted.
2.2 Dynamic Semantics
The definition of the sets of free names fn(P ) and free variables fv(P ) of a process
P is straightforward, once we know that the former are bound by restrictions and
the latter by input prefixes. We identify processes up to -renaming of bound
names and variables. Furthermore, assuming that ~x and ~M stand for x
1
; : : : ; x
k
and
M
1
; : : : ;M
k
, we write Pf~x := ~Mg to indicate the capture-avoiding, simultaneous,
substitution of M
i
for x
i
within P .
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Structural congruence is defined as the least congruence relation that is a com-
mutative monoid for 0 and j and closed under the following rules
(Res Dead) (m)0  0
(Path Assoc) (M:M 0):P  M:(M 0:P )
(Repl) !P !P j P
(Res Res) (m)(n)P  (n)(m)P n 6= m
(Res Par) (m)(P j Q)  P j (m)Q m 62 fn(P )
(Res Amb) (m)a[P ]  a[(m)P ] m 6= a
Structural congruence is functional to the definition of the reduction relation of
Figure 1.
Evaluation Contexts E ::=    (n:W )E  P j E  E j P  n[E]
(ENTER) a[in b:P j Q] j b[R]  b[a[P j Q] j R]
(EXIT) a[b[out a:P j Q] j R]  b[P j Q] j a[R]
(LOCAL) (~x)P j h ~M iQ  Pf~x := ~Mg j Q
(INPUT a) (~x)aP j a[h ~M i"Q j R]  Pf~x := ~Mg j a[Q j R]
(OUTPUT a) h ~MiaP j a[(~x)"Q j R]  P j a[Qf~x := ~Mg j R]
(STRUCT) P  P
0
P
0  Q0 Q0  Q
P  Q
(CONTEXT) P  Q
EfPg  EfQg
Fig. 1. Reduction: P  Q
Ambient mobility is governed by the rules (Enter) and (Exit) of the Mobile Am-
bients. Communication can be local, as in Mobile Ambients, or across ambient
boundaries, between parent and child. The rules for communication are different
from those of [4]. The original formulation of the reduction semantics used dif-
ferent interaction patterns, as parent-child synchronization always involved a local
prefix, as illustrated by the following example:
n[(x)
p
P j p[hMiP j (x)Q j q[hNi
"
]]] (3)
the ambient n makes a downward request to read p’s local value M , while the
ambient q makes an upward write request to communicate its value N to its par-
ent. With the original semantics, the input prefix of (x)Q can non-deterministically
synchronize with either outputs. With the new semantics, instead, the only enabled
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exchange in the system (3) above is the local exchange between P and Q, as syn-
chronization requires downward and upward exchange requests to “match”.
The new reductions still fit the design principles of BA, that is resource locality.
An ambient can be viewed as possessing two channels: a private channel which
is only available for local exchanges, and an “upward channel” which the ambient
offers to its enclosing context for read and write access. There are at least two
reasons in favor of the new semantics. First, it enhances the algebraic theory of
the calculus, by reducing the intrinsic non-determinism of the original semantics
of communication. Secondly, it enhances the typing of mobility, as mobility can
be typed independently of communication (see next session). Of course, there also
are tradeoffs. In fact, the new reductions require an ambient to know the names of
its children in order to communicate with them. This makes it difficult to encode
certain protocols, such as broadcasting a message to all the children, that were
instead easily expressed with the original semantics. We leave a discussion on the
relative expressive power between the two versions for future work, and focus on
information flow security instead.
2.3 Static semantics
The structure of types for BA is similar to that of companion type systems for the
MA [10,6].
Ambient Types. Like Mobile Ambients, Boxed Ambients are “places of conver-
sation”. However, Boxed Ambients allow more than just one “topic” of conversa-
tion: in particular, the type of an ambient shows the topic of its upward conversa-
tions, but the values it exchanges locally and with its children may have different
types. More precisely,
amb[E] is the type of all ambients whose channel for exter-
nal communication carries values of type E.
Process Types. The types of processes are defined as two-place constructors
[E; F ] that trace the types of the local (E) and upward (F ) exchanges that processes
with this type may have.
Capability Types. All capabilities are assigned a type constant, noted cap. This
is possible, and sound, because the new semantics of communication disentangles
the local exchanges of an ambient from the upward accesses attempted by any
nested sub-ambients. As a consequence, ambient mobility in the new calculus is not
constrained by the type of values exchanged within ambients, and is thus orthogonal
to communication. Thus, the moded types we studied in [4] are not needed here, as
ambient mobility has no constraint. To exemplify, consider the following process:
n[ (x:W )R j hMi j (x:W
1
)
p
P j (y:W
2
)
q
Q j p[hN
1
i
"
] j q[hN
2
i
"
] ]
The process above can be safely typed with any process type, provided that (i)
M;N
1
; N
2
have types, respectively, W;W
1
;W
2
, (ii) p and q have type amb[W
1
]
and amb[W
2
], (iii) P;Q and R have type [W;E] where E is an exchange type such
that n:amb[E]. In particular, in the process above there is no risk of type confusion
between the three exchanged values M;N
1
; N
2
since read requests from children
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are distinct, and they do not interfere with local communication.
The typing rules are summarized in Figure 2. The system satisfies the following
fundamental property:
Proposition 2.1 (Subject Reduction) If   ` P : T and P  Q then   ` Q : T .
Proof. Follows as a corollary of Proposition 3.2. 2
3 A Type System for Secure Information Flow
In this section we enrich the type system of BA so as to provide static safeguards
against insecure flow of information in the evolution of well-types processes.
We presuppose a complete lattice of security levels (;), and let ; ; Æ range
over security levels. We then partition the elements of this lattice into two classes,
“high” and “low”, as formalized in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 [Low and High levels] Let (;) be a complete lattice of security
levels. A security classification is a partition of  into two non-empty sets L and H,
with L downward closed. Based on this classification, we then define the following
order:    , ( 2 L _  2 H)
3.1 Types and Judgments
The types E of exchanges, and the types of processes are defined as in Section 2.
The types of expressions are redefined as follows:
Expression Types W ::= amb[; E] ambient
 ucap[] unsafe capability
 scap[] safe capability
Each ambient type is annotated with a security level that defines the clearance of
the ambient names with that type. Capability types also have an associated security
level, and are partitioned into safe and unsafe. In particular, ucap is the type of
dangerous capabilities, those that are potential sources of flow of information: the
typing rules will ensure that such capabilities may only be exercised within high-
level ambients. Capability types are also annotated with a security level: while
the annotation of ambient types is used to assign a security level to an ambient,
the annotations of capability types are used to record the security of the actions
performed by a process. The intuition is that in cap[] (with cap 2 fucap; scapg),
 is the greatest lower bound of (the security levels of) the capabilities on a path.
This is formalized by the following “cap-type” composition:
. scap[]  scap[Æ] = scap[ u Æ]
. ucap[]  ucap[Æ] = scap[]  ucap[Æ] = ucap[Æ]  scap[] = ucap[ u Æ]
where u is relative to the order  introduced in Definition 3.1.
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(ENV EMPTY)
? ` 
(ENV NAME)
  `  a =2 Dom( )
 ; a : W ` 
(PROJECTION)
 ; a : W; 
0
` 
 ; a : W; 
0
` a : W
(SUB PROC)
E 2 fshh; E
0
g; F 2 fshh; F
0
g
[E;F ] 6 [E
0
; F
0
]
(SUBSUMPTION)
  ` P : T T 6 T
0
  ` P : T
0
(IN)
  `M : amb[E]
  ` inM : cap
(OUT)
  `M : amb[E]
  ` outM : cap
(PATH)
  `M
1
: cap   `M
2
: cap
  `M
1
:M
2
: cap
(PREFIX)
  `M : cap   ` P : [E;F ]
  `M:P : [E;F ]
(PAR)
  ` P : [E;F ]   ` Q : [E;F ]
  ` P j Q : [E;F ]
(NEW)
 ; n : amb[G] ` P : [E;F ]
  ` (n :amb[G])P : [E;F ]
(AMB)
  `M : amb[E]   ` P : [F;E]
  ` M [P ] : [shh; shh]
(DEAD)
  ` 
  ` 0 : [shh; shh]
(REPL)
  ` P : [E;F ]
  ` !P : [E;F ]
(INPUT)
 ; ~x :
~
W ` P : [
~
W;E]
  ` (~x :
~
W )P : [
~
W;E]
(OUTPUT)
  `
~
M :
~
W   ` P : [
~
W;E]
  ` h
~
M iP : [
~
W;E]
(INPUT ")
 ; ~x :
~
W ` P : [E;
~
W ]
  ` (~x :
~
W )
"
P : [E;
~
W ]
(OUTPUT ")
  `
~
M :
~
W   ` P : [E;
~
W ]
  ` h
~
Mi
"
P : [E;
~
W ]
(INPUT M )
  `M : amb[
~
W ]  ; ~x :
~
W ` P : [G;H]
  ` (~x :
~
W )
M
P : [G;H]
(OUTPUT N )
  ` N : amb[
~
W ]   `
~
M :
~
W   ` P : [G;H]
  ` h
~
M i
N
P : [G;H]
Fig. 2. Type system
The next step is to determine the security clearance of the values that are ex-
changed in a process communication. This is formalized by the following level
function  : Exchange Types ! Security Levels, where cap 2 fucap; scapg, and ?
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is the bottom element in the lattice of security levels.
(amb[; E]) = 
(W
1
    W
n
)=tf(W
1
); : : : ; (W
n
)g
(shh)=(cap[]) = ?
As we anticipated in the Introduction, we are thus stipulating that capabilities
should always be considered “low-level” values, as passing a capability does not
disclose the name occurring in the capability. Notice, furthermore, that the type of
a capability does trace the level of the target ambient: this information is needed to
detect flows of information resulting from exercising (as opposed to exchanging)
the capability in question.
The type system is defined in terms of the following classes of judgments.
  `  Well-formed Type Environment
  ` E Well-formed Exchange Type
  `

[E; F ] Well-formed Process Type at level 
  `M : W Well-typed Expression
  `
(;)
P : [E; F ] Well-typed Process
The judgments for well-formed (exchange and process) types are functional to en-
force a safe flow of data along the (anonymous) communication channels inside
and across ambient boundaries. In the judgment for well-typed processes, we use
two annotations on the turnstile, with the following intended meaning:  is the
clearance of the ambient enclosing P (if any), while  is the lower-bound on the
clearance of the actions encountered so far, and it helps define the clearance at
which P should type-check. To understand the rationale of the typing rules, con-
sider the following examples (as usual, ` denotes a low-level, while h and k are
high-level).
. the process `[(x)hhMi"] is not safe, because the observable upward exchange of
M is enabled as a result of ` exchanging a value with the high-level subambient
h. Observing an upward communication on ` may thus reveal the presence of
the high level ambient h within `. The very same reasoning shows that, instead,
l [(x)
h
0 j hMi
"
] is a secure process.
Flows of information may arise from subtler combinations of high-level and low-
level actions. In particular, such actions need not occur sequentially as suggested
by the example above. An implicit flow of information, may also arise as a result
of running two parallel threads:
. the process `[(x)hhNiP j (y)hMi"] is not secure because the local exchange
“links” the two threads, thus determining a causal dependency, and hence an
implicit flow of information.
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Both the previous examples, show that “secure” processes should satisfy a very
basic invariant, namely that “actions” following a high-level synchronization (like
(x)
h) must not be available for further low-level-context interactions. This explains
the role of  in the typing judgement of processes. When prefixing a process P
with an “action” (where action means capability, communication, and top level
presence of an ambient), that action should have clearance not lower than . In other
words,  should be non-decreasing as a well-typed process progresses. However,
this condition is not sufficient by itself.
. consider the process P = h[`[(x)kout h:0]], where a low-level ambient ` first
reads from a high-level ambient k, and then exits from the high-level location
h. In this case, the very presence, at top level, of the ambient ` represents a
public (low-level) information that depends in a private (high-level) one. This
is a problem, as the ability to test the presence of ` at top level may, implicitly,
reveal the presence of h to any low-level observer. To see the problem, and
phrase it in terms of non-interference, we may encode the observer as the context:
C() = `
1
[in `:out `:hNi
"
] j (). Now, taking H = k [in h:in `:hMi"0], a routine
check verifies that the context distinguishes P from P j H .
This last example shows that low-level ambients exiting high-level locations may
potentially disclose secret information about that high-level location. This suggests
(i) that the out capability should be deemed unsafe when the target ambient is
high-level, and (ii) that only high-level ambients should be allowed to exercise
such capability.
3.2 Typing Rules
Environment and Type Formation
As we anticipated, the rules for well-formed types provide safeguards against ex-
plicit flows, in that they guarantee that -level values only circulate over channels
(or ambients) with higher clearance. This is obtained by requiring that the clear-
ance  of an ambient a be an upper bound on the clearance of its upward exchanges
(rule Type Amb) and on the exchanges performed by the processes it contains (rule
Type Proc).
(ENV EMPTY)
? ` 
(ENV NAME)
  ` T a =2 Dom( )
 ; a : W ` 
(TYPE SHH)
  ` 
  ` shh
(TYPE CAP)
  ` 
  ` cap[]
(TYPE AMB)
  ` E (E)  
  ` amb[;E]
(TYPE PROC)
  ` E
i
(E
i
)   i = 1; 2
  `

[E
1
; E
2
]
Subtyping and Subsumption
The relation of subtyping coincides with the one defined for the system of Section
2. The rule of subsumption requires the target type to be well-formed to enable
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type promotion.
(SUB PROC)
E 2 fshh; E
0
g; F 2 fshh; F
0
g
[E;F ] 6 [E
0
; F
0
]
(SUBSUMPTION)
  `
(;)
P : [E;F ] [E;F ] 6 [E
0
; F
0
]   `

[E
0
; F
0
]
  `
(;)
P : [E
0
; F
0
]
Expressions
As suggested by the last example of x 3.1, a capability out n should be considered
unsafe if n is high-level. On the other hand, an in capability may safely be exercised
by any ambient (a low-level ambient ` entering a high-level ambient h may create
a flow of information, but only if ` were allowed to eventually exit h).
(PROJECTION)
 ; a : W; 
0
` 
 ; a : W; 
0
` a : W
(PATH)
  `M
1
: cap[
1
]   `M
2
: cap[
2
] (cap 2 fscap; ucapg)
  `M
1
:M
2
: cap[
1
]  cap[
2
]
(IN)
  `M : amb[;E]
  ` inM : scap[]
(SAFE-OUT)
  `M : amb[;E]  62 H
  ` outM : scap[]
(UNSAFE-OUT)
  `M : amb[;E]  2 H
  ` outM : ucap[]
Processes
For the rules that follow, we define Safe(; ; Æ) , ( 2 H)_ (  Æ): intuitively,
a process P is safe either (i) if it is contained within an high level ambient, or (ii)
if the clearances of the ‘actions’ performed by P do not decrease as P progresses.
(SAFE-PREFIX)
  `M : scap[Æ]   `
(;)
P : [E;F ] Safe(; ; Æ)
  `
(;)
M:P : [E;F ]
(UNSAFE-PREFIX)
  `M : ucap[Æ]   `
(;)
P : [E;F ] ( 2 H)
  `
(;)
M:P : [E;F ]
Safe prefixes are lower-bounded by , following the previous intuition. As an ex-
ample, the process (x)hout ` is well-typed only at level  2 H, as it represents a
low-level action that depends from (as it follows) a high level one. Instead, unsafe
prefixes may only be exercised within high-level ambients: this prevents low-level
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ambients from escaping from high-level contexts. Notice that mobility does not
affect the lower bound : this is safe and leaves a certain freedom to move (e.g. the
path in h:in l can be executed also at level  2 L).
The following four rules are standard, and should be self-explanatory.
(PAR)
  `
(;)
P : [E;F ]   `
(;)
Q : [E;F ]
  `
(;)
P j Q : [E;F ]
(DEAD)
  `

[E;F ]
  `
(;)
0 : [E;F ]
(NEW)
 ; n : amb[;G] `
(;)
P : [E;F ]
  `
(;)
(n : amb[;G])P : [E;F ]
(REPL)
  `
(;)
P : [E;F ]
  `
(;)
!P : [E;F ]
The (Amb) rule implements the idea that an ambient is viewed as an “action”. That
is why the rule needs the hypothesis Safe(; ; Æ) as in rule (safe-prefix). Further-
more, the process enclosed in M is typed at level Æ (the clearance of M ) and with
 initially set to the bottom security level.
(AMB)
  ` M : amb[Æ; E]   `
(Æ;?)
P : [F;E]   `

[G;H] Safe(; ; Æ)
  `
(;)
M [P ] : [G;H]
We finally come to the rules for communication, which test the predicate Safe in
ways similar to the rules for prefixes. In addition, exchanging a value affects the
lower bound  in the typing of the continuation process P . Thus, when typed at
level  2 L, a process may safely communicate with a high level subambient,
provided that all the subsequent actions are high-level. Thus, for instance, the
processes `[(x)hhxih1] and l [h`
1
ihMi
h
] are well typed, while `[hMihh`
1
i] is not.
(INPUT)
 ; ~x:
~
W `
(;(
~
W ))
P : [
~
W;E] Safe(; ; (W
i
))
  `
(;)
(~x:
~
W )P : [
~
W;E]
(OUTPUT)
  `
~
M :
~
W   `
(;(
~
W ))
P : [
~
W;E] Safe(; ; (W
i
))
  `
(;)
h
~
MiP : [
~
W;E]
(INPUT M )
  ` M : amb[Æ;
~
W ]  ; ~x:
~
W `
(;Æ)
P : [E;F ] Safe(; ; Æ)
  `
(;)
(~x:
~
W )
M
P : [E;F ]
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(OUTPUT N )
  ` N : amb[Æ;
~
W ]   `
~
M :
~
W   `
(;Æ)
P : [E;F ] Safe(; ; Æ)
  `
(;)
h
~
Mi
N
P : [E;F ]
(INPUT ")
 ; ~x:
~
W `
(;(
~
W ))
P : [E;
~
W ] Safe(; ; (W
i
))
  `
(;)
(~x:
~
W )
"
P : [E;
~
W ]
(OUTPUT ")
  `
~
M :
~
W   `
(;(
~
W ))
P : [E;
~
W ] Safe(; ; (W
i
))
  `
(;)
h
~
Mi
"
P : [E;
~
W ]
As usual, the correctness of the type system is guaranteed by the subject reduction
property.
Proposition 3.2 (Subject Reduction)
If   `
(;)
P : [E; F ] and P  Q then   `
(;)
Q : [E; F ].
It is rather straightforward to show that the type system detects, and prevents, all
unsafe forms of explicit flow, in the sense of property (?) in the Introduction (cf.
page 3). More interestingly, we can show that unsafe implicit flows are also de-
tected: this is the topic of the next section.
4 Non-interference
We start introducing the notion of ‘high-level sources’, in terms of which we then
state our NDC-based definition of non-interference.
Definition 4.1 [High-level Sources] A process P is a high-level source if and only
if (i)   `
(;)
P : T , for all security levels  and  with  2 H, and (ii) if P is of
the form M:P 0 then   `M : cap[Æ] with Æ 2 H.
Accordingly, high-level sources are well-typed processes that may only engage
‘high’ top-level interactions with any context in which they are inserted. This is
true of processes in prefixed form by virtue of condition (ii). In addition, an inspec-
tion of the typing rules verifies the following properties of any high level source P .
First, all the top-level value exchanges with P must be high-level, and so must be
all the top-level ambient occurrences in P . Secondly, the well-typedness condition
ensures that no low-level ambient may escape its enclosing high-level contexts.
Notation: We henceforth write    P : T to indicate that P is a high-level source
in  . Also, we write   ` P : [E; F ] and   ` P : ok when ;  and/or [E; F ] are
not relevant.
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4.1 Typed Equivalence
Next, we introduce a typed notion of process equivalence. The equivalence is typed
as we compare only processes with the same types, and inserted in contexts that
respect their typing. We formalize these notions below following [22].
A context C() is a process term with just one hole (). We denote with C(P )
the process resulting from replacing the hole with P in C(). Note that variables
and names that are free in P may become bound in C(P ). Thus we do not identify
contexts up to renaming of bound variables and names.
Definition 4.2 [ = Context] Let   and  be type environments and T a process
type. C() is a ( =; T )-context if   `
(;)
C() : ok with  2 L is derivable in the
type system of Section 3 enriched with the a rule that derives  ` () : T for all 
extending .
Intuitively, a ( =; T )-context is a context whose hole, of type T , is in the scope
of the binders recorded in , and whose free names and variables are contained in
 . Furthermore, the context C() must be typed at low level, that is the clearance of
external observers.
Definition 4.3 [Barbs] Define P #
n
, P  (m)(n[hMi
"
P
0
j Q
0
] j Q
00
) n =2
fmg. A process P exhibits the name n, written P +
n
iff there exists Q such that
P =) Q and Q#
n
, where =) is the reflexive and transitive closure of  .
Now we can define our notion of ‘low’ typed equivalence, relative to an underlying
security classification into ‘low’ and ’high’ levels. Based on that we then have our
definition of the non-interference.
Definition 4.4 [Typed observational equivalence and Non-interference] Assume
 ` P : T and  ` Q : T . The two processes are equivalent in , written
 . P

=
L
Q if and only if for all ( =; T )-context C() with C(P ) and C(Q)
closed, for all n with ( (n)) 2 L, C(P ) +
n
, C(Q) +
n
Definition 4.5 [Non-interference] Let  be a security lattice and P a process.
Given a security classification of  such that  ` P : T , P is secure for that
classification iff  .P 
=
L
P jH for all H such that   H : T . P is interference-
free if it secure for all security classifications of .
We conclude with the main result, a theorem that states that the type system guar-
antees non-interference for well-typed processes.
Theorem 4.6 (Non-interference)
Given any security classification, if  ` P : T and   H : T , then  . P 
=
L
P jH .
Notice that the theorem is stated, and proved, only in reference to well-typed con-
texts. Accordingly, the non-interference analysis it addresses corresponds to ver-
ifying the ‘internal’ security of a system rather than its security with respect to
external attackers.
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The non-interference proof draws on the technical tools developed by Cardelli
and Gordon for Mobile Ambients [9], adapting them to our Boxed Ambients. The
non-interference result derives from a lemma that shows that high-level sources are
low-level equivalent to the inactive process. More precisely, we show that for every
contextC() and high-level source H if C(H) is well-typed then it is indistinguish-
able at low level from C(0). Proving this result requires a characterization of all
the possible interactions between a process and the surrounding context.
4.2 Discussion
The type system we have defined to derive the non-interference proof is admittedly
somewhat restrictive. While this is unfortunate, the discipline we impose on inter-
actions between high and low-level processes has effects comparable to those found
in existing type systems for secure information-flow in simpler process calculi [16],
and multi-threaded languages [26,24,1] (cf. Section 5 for a detailed comparison).
Also, even though well-typed processes are constrained in the actions they may
perform, the type system still allows non-trivial forms of interaction between high
and low levels, both in terms of mobility, and of value exchanges. Figure 3 shows
the legal flow of information for a well-typed composition of the two processes P
and H , when H is a high-level source.
High
Low
P H
h
l
l
h
Fig. 3. Flows of information of P j H
In particular, the flows enabled by the type system are (i) those from H to the high
sub-processes of P (and vice versa), and (ii) those from the high-level components
of P to those low components of P that are not observable since they are shielded
by high-level ambients. A low-level observer may thus observe only flows of in-
formation between low-level components of P and low level components of the
surrounding context.
Also note that high-level information can be freely exchanged between the high
and low level processes of P , as long as the latter are nested within high-level
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ambients. This is because the type system ensures that these low sub-processes are
confined within high-level ambients.
In the calculus of Mobile Ambients, a similar property would be harder to en-
force. This is because the open capability represents an objective action that the
context may impose on a process. To see the consequences of that, note that to
prove our non-interference theorem in MA, a process P should be checked against
all high level processes that appear in parallel with P , in particular against the
high-level processes open h:0, for all high-level names h. This implies that pro-
cesses of the form h[P ], with P low-level, should be rejected by the type system as
not secure. To motivate, consider the process P = h[`[P 0]], for any P 0, and with
h and ` high and low-level names, respectively. This process is not interference-
free, as the context C() = `
1
[in `:out `:hMi
"
] j () may distinguish between P
and P j open h:0. A similar reasoning applies to the processes h[in `:P j Q] and
h[out l:P j Q], and in general to any process h[P 0] where P 0 is a low-level process.
All such processes are instead well-typed, and interference-free in our calculus, un-
der the additional assumption that the low-level components of P 0 do not attempt
to escape outside h.
As a further remark, we note that the proof of non-interference would not
go through in the presence of finer equivalence relations such as barbed congru-
ence, bisimulation or must testing. To see the problem with barbed congruence,
consider defining 
L
as the barbed congruence relation induced by our observ-
ability predicate P #
n
. Then, take the processes P = `[hMi" j in h:0] and the
high-level process H = h[ ]. Now take the context C() = (), and observe
that C(P jH)  R = h[`[hMi"]], while there exists no process R0 such that
C(P )  R0 and R 
L
R
0
.
5 Related Work
Volpano and Smith [26,24,25], and recently Boudol and Castellani [1] study type-
based techniques to enforce non-interference in multi-threaded imperative languages.
In their approach explicit flow is prevented by imposing constraints on variable as-
signments, while additional restrictions on conditional commands and while-loops
rule out implicit flow. In [1] the authors point out that introducing parallelism may
cause new problems, since information flow may be “disguised as control flow”,
and a program may observe (and be influenced by) the behavior of other concur-
rent components in the course of their execution. The problem is solved in [25,1]
by relying on a form of asynchrony, whereby consulting the value of a high-level
variable must not be followed by an assignment to a low variable. In BA we have
a similar problem even though in a different setting, and our solution follows the
same rationale, by imposing a non-decreasing clearance on the sequence of ‘ac-
tions’ performed by a process.
More directly related to ours are the type systems for -calculus by Honda et
al [17] and for the security  calculus by Hennessy and Riely [16]. In [17], the
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authors propose to use the informal principle of causal dependency to understand
safety of information flow in various programming language, and develop a type
system based on a behavioral notion of types to capture causality of actions. Our
approach is similar, as it also draws on the principle of causal dependency, but our
framework appears to be more complex, as in BA processes may interact both via
communications and mobility.
In [16], security levels are attached to processes and to capabilities for read-
ing/writing to channels, and a ’no read-up/no write-down’ security policy is en-
forced by typing. To prove non-interference, further restrictions must be imposed,
namely high-level processes must not evolve in low-level ones and the calculus
must be asynchronous. Under these hypotheses, the authors show that well-typed
asynchronous processes are interference free, where non-interference is defined in
a way similar to ours, based on may test equivalence. Our type system enforces
similar restrictions on the value exchanges between high and low processes, and
corresponding restrictions on mobility. Unlike [16], our result holds true for the
synchronous case as well. In [15], Hennessy has developed an enhanced type sys-
tem for teh security  calculus for which non-interference can be proved also with
respect to must test equivalence.
In [23] Sewell and Vitek introduce box-, a process calculus that provides
mechanisms for composing (partially trusted) software components and for en-
forcing information flow security policies. Their approach is based on a colored
semantics, which annotates output processes with the sets of principals that have
affected them (the processes) in the past; then the security properties are stated in
terms of a colored lts. Finally, they introduce a type system that statically captures
causal flows. As such, the characterization of information flow security is based
on a causal model, rather then on non-interference as in our approach. Further
important differences are the asynchronous semantics of box- (as opposed to the
synchronous semantics of BA) and our treatment of mobility and nested topology.
A more in-depth comparison between the two approaches deserves to be made.
No type-based study of non-interference appears to have been conducted on
ambient-based calculi. A number of papers have instead dealt with other aspects
of security. Cardelli et al. present a type system for Mobile Ambients [7] based on
the notion of group names, that statically prevents unwanted propagation of names.
The typing system by Levi and Sangiorgi [18] for Safe Ambients provides finer
control over ambient interactions and prevents ‘grave interferences’. Dezani and
Salvo, in [12], develop a type system for Mobile Ambients in which ambient types
are associated with security levels in ways similar to ours, and security checks are
over opening and moves.
Other approaches based on type systems [3] and control-flow analyses have also
been applied [21,20] to analyze different security properties of (various dialects
of) mobile ambients. In particular Braghin et al. [2] study ’explicit’ information
flow security in the scenario of pure Mobile Ambients by defining a control-flow
analysis to detect security breaches arising as confidential data moving outside any
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voundary protection.
6 Conclusions
We have studied information flow security in the calculus of Boxed Ambients. We
have developed a notion of non-interference based on a typed equivalence induced
by “low level observations”, and presented a sound type system whose well-typed
processes are guaranteed to be interference-free. To our knowledge, no such study
has been conducted in the existing literature.
Plans of future work include the development of refined type systems capable of
capturing stronger non interference properties based on stricter equivalences, and of
type and effect systems allowing more flexibility in the typing of value exchanges
and mobility. Also, it would be desirable to extend the non-interference proof to
the case of partially-typed systems.
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